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I.   INTRODUCTION
As progress is made toward electricity market deregulation there is a simmering
controversy over whether or not utilities are entitled to compensation for so-called stranded
costs. Stranded costs are costs arising from investments made during past decades that will be
unrecoverable, or “stranded,” by the advent of competition.2  Examples include undepreciated
costs associated with high-cost power plants and costs associated with long-term, often
government-mandated, contracts.  In total, the magnitude of such unrecoverable costs is
estimated to be as high as $200 billion.3
The significant amounts at stake imply that the disposition of stranded costs will have a
significant impact on those ultimately forced to bear them, whether shareholders, taxpayers, or
electricity consumers.  As a consequence, a lively debate has ensued with numerous voices
speaking both for and against recovery.  Those in favor of utility cost recovery argue that
utility rates of return did not compensate them for the risk of future competition, prudence
                                               
1 Fellow, Energy and Natural Resources Division, Resources for the Future, 1616 P St. NW, Washington DC
20036 (boyd@rff.org).  The author wishes to thank Tim Brennan and Doug Bohi for useful comments.  The
views expressed herein are solely those of the author.
2 The beginnings of electricity deregulation can be traced to the 1978 Public Utility Power Regulatory Policies
Act (PURPA) which fostered, and demonstrated the feasibility of, independent power generation.  PURPA led
to the 1992 Energy Policy Act (EPAct), which ordered the  Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to
open utility transmission grids to independent generators.   In 1996, FERC issued Order 888 to implement this
mandate.
3 E. Hirst and L. Baxter, “How Stranded Will Electric Utilities Be?” Public Utilities Fortnightly (Feb. 15,
1995): 30–32.-2- James Boyd
reviews by regulators ensured that utility investments were proper, and that investment in the
industry would be discouraged if cost recovery in not allowed.4  Those opposed argue that
utilities have never been insulated from losses due to changes in policy;5 most stranded costs
are the result of poor management, not regulatory, decisions;6 and compensation rewards poor
managerial decisions and penalizes utilities that have already written off costs.7
This paper contributes to the debate by offering an analysis based on the legal and
economic analysis of contracts.8  The paper’s overall goal is to determine whether there is a
legal duty to compensate utility shareholders for costs stranded in the move to competitive
electricity supply.  First, the analysis reviews underlying principles of law to determine whether
or not there is a legal presumption of recovery.  Then, the analysis addresses whether or not an
implicit “regulatory compact” between utilities and regulators follows from principles in the
economic analysis of law, particularly theories of efficient breach and implicit contracts.  From
an efficiency perspective, the interpretation of implicit contractual obligations following an
unspecified contingency should consider which party can best adapt to or insure against risks
                                               
4 For a particularly good exposition of this side of the argument see W. Baumol and G. Sidak, “Stranded
Costs,” Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 18 (1995): 835-49.
5 I. Stelzer, “What Happens When The Rules are Changed and the Plug is Pulled on Electric Utilities?” The
American Enterprise 5 (Nov./Dec., 1994): 76-84, esp. 81.
6 C. Studness, “The Flawed Case for Stranded Cost Recovery,” Public Utilities Fortnightly (Feb. 1, 1995):
38-40.
7 R. Michaels, “Stranded Investment Surcharges: Inequitable and Inefficient,” Public Utilities Fortnightly
(May 15, 1995): 21, 24-25.
8 For a more general discussion of the economic issues surrounding stranded cost recovery see T. Brennan and
J. Boyd, “Stranded Costs, Takings, and the Law and Economics of Implicit Contracts,” mimeo, (Washington,
DC: Resources for the Future, 1996).The "Regulatory Compact" and Implicit Contracts: -3-
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due to a costly future contingency.9  The interpreter also should consider the possibility of
“moral hazard.”  The possibility of moral hazard makes it desirable to assign liability for costs
to the party best able to  reduce the likelihood of a negative contingency arising.10  These
analyses of how courts and policy makers should interpret the duties embodied in the franchise
relationship between utilities and regulators do not lead to the automatic conclusion that
stranded costs should be fully recovered.  Quite the contrary.  As is shown, both an analysis of
expectations based on precedent and a economic analysis of the optimal contracting indicate
that recovery should occur in only a proscribed set of circumstances.  Moreover, in cases
where an efficiency-based contract analysis calls for compensation, partial, rather than full,
compensation is generally called for.  It is important to note at the outset that the paper does
not address the merits of particular methods to raise revenues for cost recovery (e.g.,
transmission surcharges).
II.   CONTRACT  ECONOMICS  AND  THE  “REGULATORY  COMPACT”
Resolution of the stranded cost controversy requires the interpretation of duties created
between regulators and utilities in the course of granting profit-controlled electricity franchises.
Those in favor of utility compensation for stranded costs interpret the regulatory franchise as a
                                               
9 C. Goetz and R. Scott, “The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General Theory of Contractual Obligation,”
Virginia Law Review 69 (1983): 967-1025, reprinted in part in V. Goldberg, Readings in the Economics of
Contract Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989): 61-68; R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law
(Boston: Little, Brown and Co. 1992): 102-09.
10 R. Cooter and T. Ulen, Law and Economics (New York: Harper Collins, 1988): 277-88, 304-16; A. Edlin
and S. Reichelstein, “Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and Optimal Investment,” American Economic
Review 86 (1996): 478-501.-4- James Boyd
long-term contract, primarily between state public utility commissions (PUCs) and utilities, that
implies PUC obligations following the opening of generation markets to competition.11  For
instance, the franchise relationship between PUCs and utilities is interpreted to guarantee either
that the utility not face competition (e.g., by having the exclusive right to supply electricity
within some area) or that the utility receive some payment if competition is allowed.  In
contrast, those opposing stranded cost recovery interpret the lack of contractual guarantees as
evidence that compensation is not required.
It is worth emphasizing that if there were pre-existing, contractual agreements that
guaranteed utilities compensation for value lost in a transition to competition, then the
government would unambiguously be required to honor them.12  However, it is precisely
because franchise agreements do not explicitly assign liability for stranded costs that the issue
is so contentious.  Without the straightforward resolution that an explicit contract would
afford, attention turns to whether or not there was an “implicit contract” between PUCs and
utilities mandating cost recovery in the event of competition.  References by proponents of
recovery to a  “regulatory compact,” hint at the existence of such an “implicit contract.”13  The
issue is an open one, however.  In fact, opponents of recovery can plausibly claim that the
inability to recover costs is just as implicit in franchise agreements.
                                               
11 The bulk of electricity transactions and investments fall with state jurisdictions.  By its own estimates, only
about 9% of stranded assets come under the jurisdiction of the federal regulator FERC.
12 For a recent affirmation of the government’s duty to honor contractual obligations, see United States v.
Winstar Corp., 1996 U.S. Lexis 4266.
13 According to Michaels, supra n. 18, the first instance of the term “regulatory compact” in regulatory or
court decisions appears in 1983.The "Regulatory Compact" and Implicit Contracts: -5-
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Why did utilities and regulators fail to explicitly assign liability for stranded costs? And
how does the absence of explicit contractual provisions affect the way in which we interpret
the duties implied by the regulator-utility relationship?  To help explain why stranded cost
liability might not be explicitly accounted for it is helpful to first distinguish between complete
and incomplete contracts.  A complete contract defines the responsibilities of the contracting
parties across a “complete” set of circumstances.  At the time they agree, the parties find it in
their joint interest to be strictly bound by such a contract.  Failure to observe explicit contract
language in a complete contract setting is not uncommon.  For instance, the parties may be
relying on underlying principles of law and feel no need to explicitly restate the presumptive
allocation of liability.  Liability is eventually assigned in reference to the common law or
statutory remedy to the anticipated circumstance.14  In the absence of explicit contractual
language, the stranded cost question thus becomes one of precedent: is there a reasonable
expectation of cost recovery given underlying and applicable principles of law?  Section III
addresses this question and concludes that there is little basis in precedent for a broad-based
recovery of costs.
Another possibility is that the transition to competition was unaccounted for
contractually because it was an unforeseen contingency.  Given this interpretation, it is
necessary to view the franchise relationship as an incomplete contract.  Incomplete contracts
                                               
14 It is possible to “contract around” the common law, but in the absence of explicit language to that effect, it is
assumed that common law standards hold.  A similar issue arises in the law’s reliance on the concept of
community “custom.”  Common in accidental injury or property damage cases, court determinations of
customary practice are often used to define standards that are not explicitly defined contractually.  See
R. Epstein, “The Path to the T.J. Hooper: The Theory and History of Custom in the Law of Tort,” Journal of
Legal Studies 21 (1992): 1-38.-6- James Boyd
are those in which all possible contingencies cannot be identified at the time of the agreement.
Given the parties’ response to an unspecified contingency, it is left to the courts to decide
whether or not a contract breach has occurred and specify damages if one has.15  To resolve
these issues, courts rely on general principles of contract law.  In particular, the court will
assign liability in a way consistent with the broader, long-term public interest -- such as its
precedential impact on the value of similar, future social contracts.  Following a normative,
economic approach, liability is determined by deriving the rule that would have maximized the
contract’s expected joint benefits at the time it was created.  Section IV applies this framework
to the analysis of stranded costs.
As will be argued, it is unlikely that the possibility of competition was an unforeseen
contingency by utilities or regulators.  Therefore it is also unlikely that compensation should be
based on  an ex post determination of what the optimal contract should have been.
Nevertheless, even if this approach is taken, the case for general cost recovery is weak.
                                               
15 In a contracting model, Hermalin and Katz argue that judicial interpretation, beyond mandating specific
performance, will not improve the efficiency of outcomes expected at the time contracts are written when
contracting parties have symmetric information regarding each other’s valuations of performance.  B. Hermalin
and M. Katz, “Judicial Modification of Contracts Between Sophisticated Parties: A More Complete View of
Incomplete Contracts and their Breach,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 9 (1993): 230–55.
Their model finesses the cost of specifying contingencies, however, by assuming that “sophisticated parties”
can always define a “catch-all” contingency that includes arbitration by an outside party, e.g., a court, as one of
the actions that would take place.  It consequently appears that the need for outside determination of what to do
about stranded costs, assuming competition was an unanticipated contingency, is theoretically justified, as well
as required in practice.The "Regulatory Compact" and Implicit Contracts: -7-
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III.   DO UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES OF LAW SUGGEST AN IMPLICIT RIGHT TO RECOVERY?
The root cause of the stranded cost controversy is the advent of competitive
alternatives to the existing, regulated, vertically integrated power generation system.
Competition from lower-cost or higher-quality goods and services is a risk faced by most
producers in a competitive economy.  Having said that, however, it is also true that price-
regulated firms are required to perform services that they would not be required to perform
were they unregulated.  The provision of universal service, for instance, is not required of
unregulated firms.  In return for providing such services, regulated utilities can justifiably claim
the right to compensation of some form.  The question, however, is whether or not stranded
cost recovery is an implicitly guaranteed form of that compensation.
A first approach is to ask whether or not utilities have traditionally believed in a
guarantee of post-competition cost recovery.  The terms of contracts signed by utilities are
instructive.  Were there universal agreement on, or legal guarantees of, the right to recover
stranded costs there would be no need for utilities to protect themselves against such costs by
having customers agree to termination clauses or minimum contract lengths.  Yet these types
of contracts are common in the electricity industry.  Utility customers, particularly in wholesale
markets, have sought competitive supply options for more than two decades.16  Exposure to
self-generation, municipalization, and customer relocations routinely exposes utilities to
unrecovered costs.  Contracts which stipulate a minimum term over which customers are
required to pay for services, or cancellation provisions which involve payment if demand is
                                               
16 Otter Tail, supra n. 10, for instance, related to the sharing of bottleneck transmission facilities between
competing suppliers.-8- James Boyd
terminated, protect utilities’ ability to recover costs.  Regulators have traditionally encouraged,
and certainly have never prohibited, contracts that insulate utilities from cost recovery
concerns.17  The existence of such contracts is evidence that utilities themselves have felt that
cost recovery was not guaranteed.18
An examination of legal precedent also undermines the idea that there is an implicit
right to cost recovery.  The deregulation of other industries -- airlines, trucking, and
telecommunications -- has not involved generalized cost recovery.  While these industries were
arguably characterized by less long-lived and capital intensive assets, they provide no
precedent for a presumption of recovery.  A precedent in favor of recovery is FERC’s
treatment of stranded costs during the deregulation of the natural gas industry.  There, the
rebuttable presumption has been that costs related to take-or-pay contracts between pipelines
and producers are shared evenly between customers and utility shareholders.  Even in this case,
however, there is no precedent for a full, blanket recovery of utility costs.
                                               
17  For instance, the following language appears in the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking (“Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities”) 67 FERC
para. 61,394 (June 29, 1994), at 16: “The Commission has always permitted public utilities to include
reasonable cancellation provisions in power sales contracts in order to protect themselves from stranded costs
and to plan for the future needs of their systems.”
    Onerous cancellation provisions may not be considered reasonable for antitrust reasons.  Penalty clauses for
switching can discourage entry and generally limit customers’ ability to seek competitive sources of supply.
P. Aghion and P. Bolton, “Contracts as a Barrier to Entry,” American Economic Review 77 (1987): 388–401.
18 For a detailed analysis of the history of utility-consumer contracts, and a critique of the FERC’s stance on
recovery and interpretation of contracts, see S. Hempling, K. Rose, and R. Burns, “The Regulatory Treatment
for Embedded Costs Exceeding Market Prices: Transition to a Competitive Electric Generation Market,”
National Regulatory Research Institute, mimeo.The "Regulatory Compact" and Implicit Contracts: -9-
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Cost recovery has also received frequent judicial examination.  Case law suggests no
legal guarantee to cost recovery in the face of competition.19  A notable recent example is the
Supreme Court’s ruling in Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch.20  The Duquesne case, on appeal
from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, speaks directly to the issue of whether or not full cost
recovery should be presumed by price-regulated utilities.  In it, the court was called upon to
judge the constitutionality of a state law barring the recovery of costs associated with utility
investments that are not “used and useful.”  The Court held that broad discretion is left to the
states to determine their own rules for cost recovery and affirmed that failure to recover costs,
even for a “prudent” investment, is not evidence of a taking.21  Quoting FPC v. Texaco Inc.,22
and speaking to the protection offered by the “Takings Clause” of the Fifth Amendment, the
court emphasized that “all that is protected against, in a constitutional sense, is that the rates
fixed by the Commission be higher than a confiscatory level.”
To address the definition of what is “confiscatory” the court reviewed the history of
cost recovery jurisprudence, beginning with the fair value rule articulated in Smyth v. Ames.23
The Smyth test for cost recovery attempted to replicate the incentives created by competitive
                                               
19“The use of, or failure to obtain, patronage, due to competition, does not justify the imposition of charges that
are exorbitant and unjust to the public.”  Market Street Railway Co. v. Railroad Commission of California, 324
U.S. 548, 567 (1945), cited in M. Crew and P. Kleindorfer, The Economics of Public Utility Regulation
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986): 98.
20 488 U.S. 299 (1989).
21 According to the court, “a state scheme of utility regulation does not ‘take’ property simply because it
disallows recovery of capital investments that are not ‘used and useful in service to the public.’ ”
22 417 U.S. 380 (1974).
23 169 U.S. 466, 546 (1898).-10- James Boyd
markets.  Investments yielding positive value were to be granted an above-cost return based on
the market, or fair, value of the asset.  Bad investments were allowed no return.  As Justice
Rehnquist argued for the majority in Duquesne, the Smyth test, while yielding desirable
incentives in principle, ultimately proved impractical.  The difficulty with a fair value test is that
it requires an estimate of market value in a market without competition.  An asset’s market
value can be assessed with confidence only when there is a competitive market where the asset,
or ones similar to it, can be bought and sold.
This difficulty led to the abandonment of the fair value test, and movement to a
historical cost recovery standard, in FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co.24  Compared to the fair
value test, a historical cost standard provides less compensation for good investments.  The
firm recovers only its costs plus a presumably small margin.  However, the historical cost
standard also promises some degree of cost recovery for investments that ultimately do not
yield positive returns.
Despite the promise of recovery when investments go bad, it is important to emphasize
that full cost recovery is by no means guaranteed by a historical cost rule. To guard against
inappropriate utility investment decisions, state utility commissions review the prudence of the
investment.  Prudence reviews are a relatively loose form of oversight and are generally
thought to guard against significant abuses of the price regulation system, rather than as an
exhaustive examination of the benefits and costs of individual investments.  Also, it is
important to understand that in most cases, investments classified as prudent are not
                                               
24 320 U.S. 591 (1944).The "Regulatory Compact" and Implicit Contracts: -11-
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necessarily guaranteed recovery.25  Quoting Rehnquist,  “The loss to utilities from prudent but
ultimately unsuccessful investments under such a system is greater than under a pure prudent
investment rule [under which all prudent investments are recoverable], but less than under a
fair value approach.  Pennsylvania’s modification slightly increases the overall risk of
investments in utilities over the pure prudent investment rule.  Presumably the PUC adjusts the
risk premium element of the rate of return on equity accordingly.”
The emphasis placed on the utility’ s return to equity signals the court’s approach to
determining whether or not non-recovery of costs is constitutionally acceptable.  In Duquesne
the court urges a focus on the “overall effect” of rates, not on details of state recovery
decisions.  A key factor in finding that confiscation did not occur in Duquesne was that the
utility’s overall return on equity was adequate given the equity’s risks.  The possibility being
emphasized by the court is that compensation for apparently unrecovered costs may already
have occurred via adjustments to the utilities’ allowed rates of return. 26  To quote the majority
opinion:
“One of the elements always relevant to setting the rate under Hope is the
return investors expect given the risk of the enterprise ... it has not been shown
that the rate orders ... fail to give a reasonable rate of return on equity given the
risks under such a regime.  We therefore hold that [the Pennsylvania Act]’s
                                               
25 In this regard, it is interesting to note that antitrust immunity can be assumed under state law only if the
state’s policy is “clearly articulated” and “actively supervised.”  Without clear articulation and active
supervision immunity cannot be assumed when the firm acts on its own initiative.  The possible analogy here is
that utilities should not assume cost recovery unless cost recovery was clearly articulated and investments were
actively scrutinized by PUCs.  Neither of these conditions holds in the case of typical utility investment
decisions.
26 It can be argued that investors should have argued for increases in the rate of return, if they did not, since
under Hope regulators are legally obligated to set a utility’s rates “to compensate its investors for the risks
assumed.”-12- James Boyd
limited effect on the rate order at issue does not result in a constitutionally
impermissible rate.”
The court’s analysis in Duquesne serves a number of functions.  First, it reminds
utilities that cost recovery is not federally guaranteed -- thus undermining the argument that
recovery is implicit in the regulator-utility relationship.  Second, it highlights the possibility that
appropriate compensation for the risks posed by stranded costs may already have been granted
in the form of rate of return adjustments.  Finally, it proposes a test of whether or not stranded
cost recovery should be compelled: specifically, whether or not the returns to the firm’s equity
have been adequate given the risks to stockholders.  While this implies a firm-by-firm
evaluation, it is instructive to note that as a whole, the industry has enjoyed very healthy
returns on equity over the last twenty years, particularly when accounting for the relative safety
of utility stocks.  Between 1977 and 1991 annual total return to investors in a sample of 81
public utilities was 13.3 percent per year, while the return on stocks in the broad Standard &
Poor 500 index was 13.2 percent.27
In summary, the case for an implicit regulatory contract guaranteeing utility cost
recovery is weak.  However, this does not imply that cost recovery should never occur.  In
cases where a utility was compelled by its franchise agreement to make investments or sign
supply contracts that it otherwise would not have, the argument for recovery may be strong.
                                               
27 R. Michaels, “Stranded Investments, Stranded Intellectuals,” Regulation  1 (1996): 47-51.  Also, see
P. Bradford, “A Regulatory Compact Worthy of the Name,” The Electricity Journal  (November, 1995): 12-15
who cites an analysis by the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners indicating similar
above-market returns for electricity stocks.The "Regulatory Compact" and Implicit Contracts: -13-
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But many, and perhaps most, utility investments do not fall in this category.  For this broader
class of investments legal precedent does not indicate a reasonable presumption of guaranteed
cost recovery.
IV.   SHOULD  COMPENSATION  BE  VIEWED  AS  A  PENALTY  FOR  BREACH?
The argument made above is that competition has always been a foreseeable
contingency and utilities were free to contractually guard themselves against the risk of non-
recovery.  This, together with legal precedent on similar issues, strongly undermines the
argument for an automatic utility right to cost recovery.  Another approach to the problem,
however, is to view the utility-regulator relationship as an incomplete contract.  If we do so,
the issue of cost recovery can be addressed via a normative contract law analysis.  When
confronted with an incomplete contract, courts determine liability by asking how the parties
would have designed the contract had they accounted for the contingency ex ante.  The terms
are derived by assuming that the parties would have agreed to the contract that maximized
their expected joint surplus at the time the contract was signed.28
With this perspective, the question of whether or not there is a right to recovery is
addressed in the following way.  First, it is necessary to consider the incentives of firms and
regulators under a variety of possible compensation rules (contracts).  Having done so, the
alternative contracts can be compared.  The contract to be honored is that which, taking into
account the incentives of all parties, would have yielded the greatest overall welfare.  Thus, we
                                               
28 Courts may also consider the contract’s effect on overall social welfare.-14- James Boyd
ask whether or not the efficient utility-regulator franchise contract would include a right to
compensation given the advent of industry deregulation.  How would a contract most
efficiently allocate risks and provide for adaptation in the event of competition?
It is worth emphasizing that a common characteristic of contracts is that they require
the payment of damages in the event of a breach.29  If deregulation can be thought of as an
event leading to the breach of franchise agreements, stranded cost compensation can be viewed
as a damage payment for that breach.
Now turn to the analysis of incentives and welfare under alternative specifications of
“the contract.”  Consider first the notion that contracts are designed to allocate liability for
future contingencies to the parties who can adapt to or insure against them at least cost.  A
crucial consideration here is the ability of the parties to predict contingencies -- in this case the
advent of competition.30  Adaptability also refers to a firm’s ability to alter investment
decisions to reflect changed external conditions.  Both of these considerations suggest that
utilities should bear the cost of changed conditions.  First, the likelihood of competition in
power generation depends primarily on technology’s ability to reduce scale economies in
generation.  Utilities are clearly more expert than regulators in the prediction of technological
change in power generation.  Second, utilities are in the best position to adjust production
                                               
29  Damages for breach can lead parties under an incomplete contract to behave in a way that approximates
optimal behavior under a more fully specified contract.  See S. Shavell, “Damage Measures for Breach of
Contract,” Bell Journal of Economics, 11 (1980): 466-490.
30 Might we view the movement to competition as an endogenous, rather than exogenous, event?  In principle,
yes, since the regulator must initiate deregulation in a legal sense.  Nevertheless, deregulation is unlikely
without the technological changes that allow society to benefit from competition.  Thus, exogenous technical
change can at least be thought of as a necessary, if not sufficient, condition for deregulation.  In the next section
we address the notion of endogenous regulatory change in more detail.The "Regulatory Compact" and Implicit Contracts: -15-
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choices and investment decisions to these changes.  Moreover, the scale and corporate nature
of utilities suggests that they can adequately insure against the risks posed by change.31
An additional set of considerations arises when the utility made investments that were
required by the franchise relationship itself or when regulation prevented it from adapting to
potential competition.  Investments made to satisfy universal service requirements is one
example.  Another is that PURPA required utilities to purchase power from high cost
renewable energy sources.  Financing those sources required that the utilities enter into long
term contracts to purchase the power.  The “avoidable cost” standard, while reasonable in
principle, became in may states equivalent to a “highest cost” pricing standard.32  A utility
forced to purchase power at prices above costs ought not be required to absorb those costs if
subsequent competition makes their recovery impossible.33  However, this argument is
considerably less compelling for generators constructed by the utilities themselves, unless there
is similar evidence that regulators forced them to do so.34
In these type of cases, long-term contracts (which serve to ensure at least partial cost
recovery) are likely to be optimal.  Without them, utilities would correctly fear customer or
                                               
31 Theory suggests that large, publicly traded firms should be risk neutral.  Because investor risks can be
minimized via portfolio diversification alone, risk averse (and thus non-profit-maximizing) management
strategies are not be valued by shareholders.
32 Brennan et al., supra n. 1 at 31.
33 A similar conclusion would apply to utility expenditures on environmental conservation technologies that
they would not have undertaken in the absence of regulatory requirements.
34 A potentially interesting source of evidence would be statements by utility executives at the time of plant
construction.  If they were advertised as the efforts of farsighted private enterprise rather than compelled by
coercive regulators, it is disingenuous to contend that the value of those investments should be insulated from
competition.-16- James Boyd
regulator exploitation once specific investments were made.  The requirement that regulators
allow utilities a “just and reasonable” return on investment represents a public commitment to
prevent opportunistic expropriation of sunk investments by regulated firms.  This is particularly
true in electricity markets where up-front investments are large, immobile, and long-lived.35  In
the language of contracts, these types of investments create issues of reliance.  Reliance relates
to the situation in which one party takes an action (bears costs) before, and in anticipation of,
the final performance of a contract.  Following the reliance expenditure, an uncertainty may be
resolved that bears on whether or not the contract should be performed.  In many instances,
even though up-front costs have been sunk, it may ultimately be inefficient for the other party
to honor its obligations.
The optimal contract in such a situation must strike a balance.  On the one hand, a
utility must be given insurance against the opportunism of customers who may prematurely
depart despite large utility expenditures made to serve them.36  On the other hand, moral
hazard arises if the utility feels that all its expenditures will be compensated, regardless of
                                               
35 The problem of opportunism and relationship-specific assets is identified and analyzed in B. Klein,
R. Crawford, and A. Alchian, “Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting
Process,” The Journal of Law and Economics 21 (1978): 297-326, and O. Williamson, “Transaction-Cost
Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations,” The Journal of Law and Economics 22 (1979):
233-261.  Also, see V. Goldberg, “Regulation and Administered Contracts,” Bell Journal of Economics 7
(1976): 426-448.  Goldberg  argues that in the “natural monopoly sector” contracts protecting the monopoly are
likely due to the immobility and long-life of their capital investments.  His article also includes the following
prescient statement:  “If the life of the capital does not coincide with the life of the contract, then when the
contract expires (or is prematurely terminated) it will be necessary to determine ... the “fair market value” of
the surviving capital ... if it is owned by the provider but must (or ought to) be sold back to the other party or
the new provider” (at 444).
36 It may also be possible that utility rates of return are used to compensate shareholders, as noted in the
previous section.  If so, allowed returns might act as an independent inducement for reliance expenditures.The "Regulatory Compact" and Implicit Contracts: -17-
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whether they were appropriate or not.  In other words, the utility may over-rely on the contract
if reimbursed for all its costs.  In general, joint surplus is maximized by a contract that can be
breached if conditions -- such as the possibility of competition -- warrant, subject to the
payment of partial compensation for reliance expenditures.37
The possibility of regulatory opportunism clearly creates a rationale for cost recovery.
Note, however, that it does not provide a rationale for full cost recovery.  Full compensation
maximizes utility moral hazard.  For this reason, it is very unlikely that a promise of full
compensation would have maximized the utility-regulator contract ex ante.  Even when cost
recovery is indicated this should not be interpreted to imply full cost recovery.  The optimal
percentage of cost recovery can only be determined by a case-by-case analysis.
The analysis of stranded cost recovery as a contract issue leads to the conclusion that
cost recovery should not be assumed by default.  First, underlying principles of regulatory and
case law do not point toward recovery.  Second, even when it appears clear that firms made
investments to serve franchise obligations, compensation may already have occurred via rate of
return adjustments.  The most favorable case for recovery assumes that competition was
unanticipated and that utility expenditures should be viewed as reliance investments.  Even
here, however, contract theory implies that compensation should only be partial.  Moreover,
                                               
37 See Shavell, supra n. 37.  Also S. Masten and K. Crocker, “Efficient Adaptation in Long-Term Contracts:
Take-or-Pay Provisions for Natural Gas,” The American Economic Review 75 (1985); 1083-1093.  They
analyze “take or pay” contracts which require purchasers to pay for a minimum level of a good or service even
if they do not ultimately use it or take delivery.  They show that this mechanism mimics an incomplete contract
with a partial penalty for contract breach.
    Contract breach can be efficient when unanticipated contingencies arise.  Properly designed, a contract
penalty allows for breach only when breach is efficient, thus counteracting the tendency once resources are
committed for the purchaser to opportunistically renege on the agreement.-18- James Boyd
advocates of compensation must still explain why utilities failed to secure explicit contractual
cost recovery guarantees.  And to do so they must argue that the likelihood of competition at
the time franchises were granted was too small to be worth the cost of explicitly including it in
contracts.
V.   CONCLUSIONS
The outcome of the stranded cost controversy will undoubtedly be influenced in large
degree by the interplay of political forces at both the state and federal level.  However, legal
and economic analysis, if called upon, can contribute significantly to a socially desirable
resolution of the debate.  The paper has shown that legal and economic analysis is helpful in
clarifying both (1) whether or not there was an implicit commitment to cost recovery and
(2)whether such a commitment would have been in the broad social interest ex ante.  The
clarification of these issues, in turn, speaks directly to the question of whether or not utility
stranded costs should be compensated during the process of deregulation.  An analysis of legal
precedent and normative contract theory yields little in the way of rationale for full cost
recovery.  There is no precedent for the broad claims to recovery that are being advocated by
utility interests.  Moreover, the ability to adapt to contingencies, insure against them, and the
desire to avoid moral hazard all point away from a right to full recovery.
The argument in favor of compensation is stronger in situations that carry the
possibility of regulatory opportunism.  Regulatory law should, and does, prevent regulators
from exploiting utilities that make irreversible investments in the service of the public, rather
than their private, interest.  Investments made to satisfy universal service requirements or thoseThe "Regulatory Compact" and Implicit Contracts: -19-
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explicitly mandated by regulators, such as inefficient power purchase contracts, are most likely
to fall in this category.  Even this argument for cost recovery, however, assumes that utilities
have not already been compensated via rate of return adjustments.  Taken together, these
arguments suggest that opponents of recovery have a strong legal and economic basis for their
position.  The burden of proof properly resides, on a case by case basis, with the advocates of
cost recovery.